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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
In general the "collateral source rule" has found favor
with many courts and has been liberally applied in a variety
of situations. A reason for this favor, it is submitted, is
the basic proposition that the duty of the wrongdoer is to
answer for the damages wrought by his wrongful act, and
that such damages are measured by the whole loss so caused.12
For these reasons, and in light of the fact that Ostmo
v. Tennyson seems to have brought the spirit of the "collat-
eral source rule" to North Dakota, it is felt that this prin-
ciple should not be overlooked in computing damages and
should be applied in North Dakota litigation.
MAURICE E. COOK
INSURANCE-SUICIDE-INSURER HAS TO PROVE SUICIDE
MORE PROBABLE THAN ANY OTHER THEORY-A life insurance
policy provided that in the event that death was caused by
suicide the policy would be void. The insured's body was
found amid circumstances which showed death could have
been a suicide and the insurance company defended on that
ground. The trial judge's instruction to the jury, consistent
with a well established rule in Iowa,' was, in effect, that
the insurer had to produce evidence sufficient to exclude
every other reasonably probable theory as to the cause of
death. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa, abrogating
the above mentioned rule, held, three justices dissenting and
one justice dissenting in part, that evidence showing suicide
was more probable than any other theory was sufficient.
Bill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 119 N.W. 2d 768 (Iowa
1963).
The law of England imposed a severe penalty for the
taking of one's own life. 2 The resulting hardship on the
12. Francis v. Atcheson, T. & S. F. Ry.. 113 Tex. 202, 253 S.W. 819.
822 (1923).
1. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. National Life Ass'n, 208 Iowa 246, 225 N.W.
242 (1929); Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N.W. 808
(1921); Mickalek v. Modern Bhd. of America, 179 Iowa 33, 161 N.W. 125
(1917); Wood v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, 166 Iowa 391.
147 N.W. 888; Stephenson v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 108 Iowa 637, 79 N.W. 459
(1899).
2. Blackstone relates that the law of England required the forfeiture
of all of the deceased's goods and chattels to the Crown and required an
ignominious burial on the public highway with a stake driven through
the body. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 190 (Lewis' ed. 1897).
(VOL. 39
1963] RECENT CASES
deceased's family is said to be the historical basis for the
presumption against suicide.3  That presumption is univer-
sally accepted although love of life and the immorality of
self-destruction are usually given as the reasons for its exis-
tence.
4
Generally, proof of death coupled with the presumption
against suicide makes a prima facia case for the plaintiff
benificiary in a life insurance litigation.5  There is dis-
agreement, however, as to the function of the presumption
subsequent to that step in the controversy. Wigmore's as-
sertion that the presumption disappears when confronted by
evidence of suicide6 is followed by some courts.7  Others
maintain that the presumption itself is evidence.8 In those
jurisdictions there is much confusion as to the weight and
effect of that evidence. 9
North Dakota views the presumption in much the same
light as did Iowa prior to the instant decision.' 0 The pre-
sumption does not disappear when confronted by evidence
of suicide,' it has the weight of affirmative evidence,' 2 and
circumstantial evidence must exclude every other reasonably
3. See Hartman, The Presumption Against Suicide as Applied in the
Trial of Insurance Cases, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 20 (1934).
4. See, e.g., Perringer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 241 Mo. App. 521.
244 S.W.2d 607 (1951); Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 102 Neb. 629. 168
N.W. 258 (1937); Fehrer v. Midland Cas. Co., 179 Wis. 431, 190 N.,V. 910
(1922).
5. See, e.g., Canada Life Assur. Co. v. Houstan, 241 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.
1957); Gulf Life Ins. Co., 257 App. Div. 656, 15 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1939); Swihovec
v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939).
6. "... [T]he peculiar effect of a presumption of law' (that is, the
real presumption) is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to.
reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the
opponent. If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient
to satisfy the Judge's requirements of some evidence), the presumption
disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in the jury's hands free from
any rule." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
7. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938);
Ziegler v. Equitable Life Assur. Co. of U.S., 284 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1960);
Kettlewell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 6 Ill. App. 2d 434, 128 N.E.2d
652 (1955); Headie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 S.D. 499, 12 N.W.2d 313
(1943).
8. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 60 Ariz. 416, 138 P.2d 414
(1943); Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 296 N.W. 800 (1941);
Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942).
9. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Satcher, 152 Fla. 411. 12 So. 2d 108
(1943); Cox v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Me. 167, 28 A.2d 143 (1942):
Stuckum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Mich. 297, 277 N.W. 891 (1938):
Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 132 Neb. 831, 273 N.W. 478
(1937).
1 10. Compare Mickalek v. Modern Bhd. of America, 179 Lowa 33, 161
N.W. 125 (1917). with Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 21 N.D.
235, 130 N.WV. 231 (1911).
11. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
12. See Svihovec v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939);
Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen, 21 N.D. 235, 130 N.W. 231 (1911); Clemens v.
Royal Neighbors, 14 N.D. 116, 103 N.W. 402 (1905).
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probable theory as to the cause of death before the pre-
sumption is rebutted.-3
No less authority than the Supreme Court of the United
States, by implication in one case 14 and by adopting the
contra view in at least one other,'15 has shown opposition to
North Dakota's approach to this presumption.
Self-destruction is not uncommon. 16 It is submitted that,
by holding insurance companies to a standard of proof high-
er than other litigants, the courts are working a hardship
on the insurer. Iowa's change of attitude seems desirable.
North Dakota should follow the example.
LARRY KRAFT
STAR DECISIS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-PROSPECTIVE OVER-
RULING-The plaintiff brought an action against the de-
fendant school district, its principal, and a teacher for in-
juries sustained through the alleged negligence of the defend-
ants. The action against the school district was dismissed
by the District Court on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the District Court but
prospectively ruled that after the adjournment of the 1963
Minnesota Legislature the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity
would not be available to school districts, municipal corpora-
tions or other government subdivisions which had previously
been granted immunity by the court. Recognizing that the
prospective ruling was dictum the court said that equity
required that those who had depended on the prior law be
given time to protect themselves. Spanel v. Mound View
School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
Sovereign immunity from tort liability has been a well
established principle of law.' This doctrine has been criticized
13. Svihovec v. Woodmen Ace. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939):
see Clemens v. Royal Neighbors, 14 N.D. 116, 103 N.W. 402 (1905).
14. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959) (dictum).
15. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 (1938).
16. In 1961 there were 19,170 suicides reported in the United States
which is more than half as many deaths as were caused by motor vehicle
accidents. WORLD ALMANAC 304 (Hansen ed. 1963).
1. Mower v. The Inhabitants of Lecester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Rogers
v. Holmes,. 214 Ore. 687, 332 P.2d 608, 611 (1958) "That a sovereign state
cannot be sued without its consent is a cardinal principle of law so well
established as to require no citation."
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